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Abstract— Covert channels can be used to circumvent system and
network policies by establishing communications that have not
been considered in the design of the computing system. We con-
struct a covert channel between different computing systems that
utilizes audio modulation/demodulation to exchange data between
the computing systems over the air medium. The underlying
network stack is based on a communication system that was orig-
inally designed for robust underwater communication. We adapt
the communication system to implement covert and stealthy
communications by utilizing the ultrasonic frequency range.
We further demonstrate how the scenario of covert acoustical
communication over the air medium can be extended to multi-hop
communications and even to wireless mesh networks. A covert
acoustical mesh network can be conceived as a meshed botnet
or malnet that is accessible via inaudible audio transmissions.
Different applications of covert acoustical mesh networks are
presented, including the use for remote keylogging over multiple
hops. It is shown that the concept of a covert acoustical mesh
network renders many conventional security concepts useless, as
acoustical communications are usually not considered. Finally,
countermeasures against covert acoustical mesh networks are
discussed, including the use of lowpass filtering in computing
systems and a host-based intrusion detection system for analyzing
audio input and output in order to detect any irregularities.
Index Terms— malware, network covert channels, wireless mesh
networks, ultrasonic communication
I. INTRODUCTION
If we want to exploit a rigorously hardened and tested type
of computing system or networks of this type of computing
system, we have to break new ground. Covert channels are
communication channels utilizing means for communications
that have not been designed for communication at all [3].
With a covert channel, we can circumvent system and network
security policies by exploiting new, previously unregarded
communication media. In operating systems, covert channels
are usually established by exploiting shared resource access
between different processes, establishing a covert storage
channel by encoding data in parts of the operating system that
were not considered for communication at all or establishing
a covert timing channel by manipulating and analyzing the
timing behavior of shared resources. In computer networks,
covert storage channels can be established by utilizing nor-
mally unused parts of communication protocol headers and
covert timing channels could be established over the timing
behavior of network requests.
As a shared media for covert communications, not only
shared computing resources or preexisting network interfaces
could be used. One can imagine a covert network channel
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between different computing systems, establishing a com-
pletely new network interface based on physical emanations
(see also [4]). Alongside the established radio emanations fre-
quently used in network communications, optical or acoustical
emanations could also be used as means for communications.
Although the existing radio communication standards are
mature enough for regular wireless communications, they are
not used in our scenario as they are already known to the com-
puting system’s operating system and actively managed by the
operating system. For covert communications we specifically
demand devices that are:
1) Usable as either a sending or a receiving device, i.e.,
they are able to output or input a physical emanation
type.
2) Accessible to the sending or receiving process.
3) Not yet established as a communication device and,
therefore, not subject to the system and network policies.
4) Able to support stealthy communication to prevent im-
mediate detection of the covert channel.
In this article, we specifically target covert communications
over acoustical emanations, utilizing speakers and micro-
phones (available in commonly available computing systems)
as sending and receiving devices (see 1) that are commonly
accessible (see 2) to application partitions of the operating
systems that might be in need to process audio (e.g., for
video conferencing or IP phone communications). Speakers
and microphones are also not established as means for commu-
nication and are not widely considered in security and network
policies (see 3). Regarding 4, stealthy communication can
be implemented in acoustical networks by utilizing inaudible
frequencies, i.e., the ultrasonic and near-ultrasonic frequency
ranges.
We do not only target covert communication between two
computing systems or two isolated application partitions on a
single computing system, but we establish means for multi-hop
communications between different participants. As the under-
lying communication system, we utilize a specific network
stack that has originally been developed for underwater com-
munications. Preexisting TCP/IP stacks could not reasonably
be utilized for acoustical networks due to their comparably
large overhead, but a loosely related addressing scheme with
less overhead is utilized (see Section III).
By providing multi-hop communication, we can signifi-
cantly extend the communication range of the covert channel
in order to interconnect scattered devices to a full-fledged
wireless mesh network. With a covert acoustical mesh net-
work, we can offer a whole range of covert services to the
participating computing systems, including Internet access via
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an IP proxy.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In
Section II, we introduce the concept of covert networks and
a scenario for covert and stealthy wireless communication
between isolated computing systems. In Section III, we present
the fundamental concepts of the underlying communication
system that we are using for covert communications in the
targeted scenario. In Section IV, we describe our experimental
setup for covert communications and necessary adaptions to
the utilized communication system. We construct an acoustical
mesh network and describe the performance and reliability of
the utilized communication system in the targeted scenario. In
Section V, we present different applications for covert mesh
networks. In Section VI, we explore potential countermeasures
against participation in a covert acoustical mesh network. In
Section VII, we discuss related work and how it differs from
our work. In Section VIII, we conclude the article, discussing
our results and giving an outlook at possible future research.
II. SCENARIO
The basic scenario for covert communications between two
computers is depicted in Fig. 1.
Hardware (H)
Partition pi
Kernel (K)
Hardware (H)
Partition pk
Kernel (K)
= Sound Card
X
= Network Interface Card
Figure 1. Scenario for two computers as part of a covert network.
Two computers that are not connected to each other via
established types of network interfaces (e.g., IEEE 802.3
Ethernet [5] or IEEE 802.11 WLAN [6]) or that are prohibited
to communicate with each other over these established types
of network interfaces are, nevertheless, able to communicate
with each other by using their audio input and output devices
(microphones and speakers).
We assume a high-assurance setup where a component-
based operating system (as described by Jaeger et al. [7] as
an operating system that consists of a small trusted computing
base and individual service components) is used to define fine-
grained mandatory access control policies for communications
between isolated application partitions. A component-based
operating system is usually governed by a reference monitor
in the kernel K (as introduced by Anderson [8]), which is an
access control monitor that has always to be invoked in IPC
(here: inter-partition communication) decisions.
Even in a component-based operating system that is gov-
erned by a reference monitor, acoustical communication is
possible between pi and pk, representing application partitions
on different computing systems, as long as audio input and
output devices as part of the underlying hardware H are
accessible to both pi and pk (the utilized terminology is also
described in [4]). While it would be an easy solution to just
disallow access to the audio hardware, this is not possible,
when pi and pk are in need of audio access (e.g., for IP
phone conversations). Still there are applicable countermea-
sures against participation of a computing system in a covert
acoustical network, as it will be presented in Section VI.
We will now extend the scenario of a covert acoustical
network to a covert acoustical mesh network. A possible
topology of a covert mesh network is depicted in Fig. 2.
Shared Physical Environment
SMTP Server
Internet
Figure 2. Topology of a covert mesh network that connects a shared physical
environment to an SMTP server inside the Internet.
In a covert acoustical mesh network, more than two comput-
ing systems in a shared physical environment (i.e., within the
physical communication range between two connected nodes)
can be connected to the mesh network and computing systems
are able to communicate indirectly by following routing paths
over multiple hops. We distinguish between three types of
participants in a covert mesh network:
Infected drone
An infected computing system that offers covert
services or serves as a router in the covert mesh
network.
Infected victim
An infected computing system that is targeted by
the attacker to secretly leak information to other
participants of the covert mesh network.
Attacker
The computing system controlling the covert mesh
network, and the receiver of leaked information.
Each of these participants is configured as a sender or a
receiver. In case of the infected drone, the computing system
has to be configured both as a sender and a receiver, while the
infected victim could just be used as a sender and the attacker
could only be configured as a receiver. All participants must
have installed a compatible acoustic communication system,
either by infection of a malware or actively installed (on the
attacker). The implementation details of the utilized acoustic
communication system are described in the following section.
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III. COMPOSITION AND ADAPTION OF THE UNDERLYING
COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
A. A Network Stack for Acoustic Communication
Acoustical communication is seldom seen in terrestrial
networks since radio offers much higher bit rates and com-
munication ranges. However, acoustical communication is the
method of choice in underwater networks, because electro-
magnetic waves are highly absorbed by sea water. We are,
therefore, able to implement a terrestrial acoustical network on
top of preliminary studies about robust underwater acoustical
communication.
The utilized network stack is an adaption of an emula-
tion system for underwater acoustical networks [9] from the
Research Department for Underwater Acoustics and Marine
Geophysics (FWG) of the Bundeswehr Technical Center WTD
71 in Kiel, Germany. It is split into four layers of connected
applications (not to be confused with the TCP/IP stack):
1) Application Layer (APP)
2) Network Layer (NET)
3) Error Correction Layer (EC)
4) Physical Link Layer (PHY)
All layered applications of the network stack are indepen-
dent and connected via internal TCP connections for IPC
(inter-process communication), as shown in Fig. 3. This struc-
ture allows to replace any of the modules, e.g., the application
layer module, without the need to touch one of the other layers.
The error correction layer is optional and can be left out on
devices with limited processing power or memory.
The left column in Fig. 3 lists the layers of the TCP/IP
stack, while the right column shows the associated lay-
ers/applications within the acoustic emulation system. In the
following subsections all three layers (application, network
and physical link) are described in detail.
B. Application Layer
The application layer uses the frame format GUWAL
(Generic Underwater Application Language) from
FWG/FKIE [10]. GUWAL is an operational application
language for tactical messaging in underwater networks
with low bandwidth. It is based on 16 byte data frames,
which include 2 bytes for a header in the beginning and
2 bytes for a CRC checksum at the end. The structure of
the GUWMANET/GUWAL protocol is depicted in Fig. 4
(GUWMANET is described in the following section).
The GUWAL header contains a type field, a priority and
an acknowledgement flag, two short operational addresses
with 6 bit each, a source and a destination address. By only
consuming 6 bit, source and destination addresses are designed
smaller than regular 32 bit IPv4 addresses in order to save
bandwidth. Nevertheless, the address range is sufficient for
small acoustic mesh networks. Additionally, each GUWAL
address can also be used as multicast address, if necessary.
EC
NET
PHY
APP
= TCP Connection
= Optional Component
Port 2343
Port 2342
Port 2341 / 2342
Port 2343
Port 2342
Port 2341
Application
and 
Transport 
Layers
Network 
Layer
Link Layer
(error 
correction)
Link Layer
(physical 
access)
Figure 3. Communication system architecture for covert acoustical mesh
networks.
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Figure 4. The GUWMANET/GUWAL protocol.
Some potential applications for covert acoustical mesh net-
works based on GUWAL are described in detail in Section V.
For our experiments we implemented an example application
that parses UTF-8 characters from STDIN. After the GUWAL
header one additional byte is used at the application layer
to specify the type of payload. Each data frame can include
a payload of up to eleven characters. Frames are sent via a
TCP connection to the network layer where they are further
processed for output.
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C. Network Layer
In the network layer we use the ad-hoc routing proto-
col GUWMANET (Gossiping in Underwater Mobile Ad-
hoc NETworks) from FKIE/FWG [11] as the counterpart to
GUWAL. GUWMANET reuses the two 6 bit operational
source and destination addresses of GUWAL for network
routing. Due to the fact that these addresses can be used as
multicast addresses they do not have to be unique in the net-
work. GUWMANET introduces a new 5 bit network address,
which should be unique in the local 2 hop neighborhood. This
allows to distinguish between all neighbors, which is important
to build up routes. In the current version of GUWMANET
these network addresses must be set statically. It is intended by
FWG/FKIE to implement an automatic network configuration
procedure in a future version.
The network header of GUWMANET consists of two
address fields, as can be seen in Fig. 4. The first address
field contains the network address of the current transmitter.
The second field contains the network address of the previous
node which forwarded the message before (last hop). While
the source and destination addresses of the GUWAL header
are end-to-end addresses and static during the complete for-
warding process, the transmitter and last hop address in the
GUWMANET header changes at each hop.
The route establishment operates on the principle of reactive
routing protocols. The first message is flooded through the
network. Each node repeats the message and sets the last hop
field to the network address of the first node it received the
message from. A node generates a temporary routing entry if
it overhears that it was selected as last hop in a forwarding
from one of its neighbors. After the message reaches one of
the destination nodes, it replies with an acknowledgement that
is routed back with the temporary routing entries to the source.
On the way back, the route is persisted for all further packets.
If a route breaks down, the route establishment is initiated
again. Further details on the routing protocol are provided by
Goetz and Nissen [11].
D. Link Layer
1) General Considerations: At the link layer, we provide
the PHY application, which includes the modem of the
Adaptive Communication System (ACS), originally developed
by FWG and based on GNU Radio [12], an open-source
development toolkit for signal processing.
2) Error Correction Layer: Both modems can benefit from
the optional EC (error correction) layer from FWG/FKIE. The
EC layer uses the 16 bit checksum included at the end of each
packet to restore packets with one or two bit errors. If a node
receives multiple error-prone versions of the message, the EC
layer tries to merge them into a correct one. More details on
the error correction will be included in a future article.
3) Physical access using ACS modem: The ACS modem
uses JANUS [13], a robust signaling method for underwater
communications. It is based on FHSS (frequency-hopping
spread spectrum) with 48 carriers (20 carriers are used for
pure ultrasonic communication in this article). Fig. 5 shows
the spectrogram that reveals the frequency hopping within a
transmission of the ACS modem.
Figure 5. Signal spectrogram—The results of the utilized frequency hopping
algorithm are made visible.
The center frequency was modified from 4,200 Hz to 21,000
Hz (18,600 Hz with the originally presented waveform [1]),
completely placing the signal into the ultrasonic frequency
range. In order to avoid undersampling, the sampling fre-
quency was modified from 12,800 Hz to 48,000 Hz and the
sample size for each bit value was modified from 256 to 1024.
It could be observed that the ACS modem (running on top of
a Lenovo T400) was not capable of calculating the IFFT/FFT
of size 1024 fast enough in software. Therefore, for any bit
position j within a output frame with the associated output
frequency λ(j) within the frequency hopping sequence λ and
for each sample position k, the sample sk is calculated by
Eq. (1).
sk =
1
1024
· e2pii·λ(j)k1024 · wk (1)
To obtain a better differentiation between each bit, we
multiply the sample with the window function wk, which
implements a trapezoid window and the square root of a
Hamming window, which is defined by Eq. (2) for each index
i. √
0.54 + 0.46 · cos
(
2pi (i− 1024/2)
1024
)
(2)
The resulting waveform is depicted in Fig. 6.
Figure 6. Signal waveform—The preamble and 6 transmitted bits are made
visible.
In the first 42 ms a preamble for packet detection and
synchronization is sent. We added an adapted bandpass filter
at the receiver of the original ACS modem in order to filter
for the transmitted frequency range (Fig. 7).
The bandpass FIR (finite impulse response) filter is a
Blackman-Harris window with a frequency range between
20,400 and 23,000 Hz.
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Figure 7. The bandpass FIR filter designed (Blackman-Harris window).
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND MEASUREMENTS
A. Experiment Setup
For the experimental setup we are using five laptops (model:
Lenovo T400) as the mesh network participants. As operating
system for each node, we installed Debian 7.1 (Wheezy) on
each laptop. All experiments were performed at FKIE, building
3, and without any acoustical preparations made.
B. Output Frequency Measurement
The Lenovo T400 features an Intel Corporation 82801I
(ICH9 Family) HD Audio Controller. The frequency range that
the audio processor is able to output and input is determined by
directly connecting the line in and line out jacks and recording
an increasing signal from 0 to 35,000 Hz. The resulting graph
is depicted in Fig. 8 where the output sound pressure levels
are correlated with the output signal frequency. The recorded
sound pressure levels are relative values that describe the
attenuation of the original audio signal.
Figure 8. The recorded output/input frequency response of a Lenovo T400
Laptop (Hanning window, FFT, size 512).
From the recorded frequency range it can be discovered that
we are able to process frequencies in the low ultrasonic range
around 20,000 Hz. Previously performed tests with a Lenovo
T410 Laptop featuring the Conexant 20585 audio codec (with
192 kHz DAC / 96 kHz ADC) [14] have shown very similar
results. The results lead us to the conclusion that ultrasonic
or near-ultrasonic communication with computing systems of
the Lenovo T400 series is possible.
Fig. 9 shows the output frequency spectrum of a pure
ultrasonic transmission with the ACS modem.
Figure 9. The recorded frequency range of an ACS modem transmission
(Hanning window, FFT, size 1024).
The original preamble of the ACS modem has been replaced
by a 0.042 s long preamble (see also waveform, Fig. 6),
which is also placed in the ultrasonic frequency range. The
transmission was found to be inaudible to the observers of the
experiment at the configured volume levels.
C. Range Experiment
In another experiment we interconnect two laptops in order
to gain an understanding of the achievable range in a covert
acoustical mesh network. Acoustic waves are attenuated during
transmissions in air (or water) due to scattering, absorption
and reflection, leading to lower sound pressure levels in
the received signal. The degree of attenuation is specifically
depending on the distance between transmitter and receiver
and on the frequencies used in data transmission. Therefore,
we should be able to communicate over longer distances
with sub-ultrasonic frequencies in comparison to ultrasonic
frequencies. Fig. 10 shows the setup of the range experiment.
N5 N2
FKIE, Building 3,Floor 1, Corridor 284 - 294
Figure 10. Schematic view of the range experiment.
As depicted, the range experiment is performed in an
approximately 25 m long corridor at FKIE. Both nodes are
placed in direct line of sight to each other with the displays
directed at each other so that output of the internal speakers
(built-in alongside the keyboard) is loosely directed at the
corresponding node. The achievable range is determined by
repeatedly transmitting messages and gradually increasing the
distance between the nodes with each successful transmission.
1) Measurements with ACS Modem: With the ACS mo-
dem, transmissions over a distance of up to 8.2 m could be
observed with a transmission rate of approximately 20 bit/s.
Moreover, distances of 19.7 m have been overcome with the
originally presented waveform that is placed slightly below the
ultrasonic frequency range [1]). As it was already presented in
Fig. 8, the frequency response of the utilized audio hardware
gradually decreases for frequencies ≥ 20,000 Hz, and this is
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one of the reasons that the near-ultrasonic frequency range
below 20,000 Hz (which might be considered less stealthy in
comparison to the ultrasonic frequency range ≥ 20,000 Hz) is
more stable in covert acoustical transmissions. No bit errors
could be observed in transmissions over these ranges. While
much higher transmission rates are generally possible with
acoustical communication (using a less narrow band), tests
with a configured transmission rate of 20 bit/s have been the
most successful in transmissions over distances ≥ 5 m. Thus,
we conclude that the achievable transmission rate is highly
dependent on the desired transmission distance.
D. Interconnection Experiment with ACS Modem
Fig. 11 shows the experiment setup for a covert network of
5 participants with the adapted ACS modem.
R290a
R285
R289
R287
R288
N5
FKIE, Building 3, Floor 1
N2
      N3
N4
N1
Figure 11. Schematic view of the interconnection experiment.
The nodes are placed in a mixed office/lab environment
at FKIE. Every node is placed in direct line of sight to
another node in order to establish connectivity. While indirect
communication over reflections from walls and doors has
also been tested, connectivity could only be established over
direct communications. Tab. I shows the distances between
connected nodes in the performed experiment.
As one GUWMANET/GUWAL packet is transmitted over a
duration of approximately 6 s, a three-hop transmission (using
4 computers) would have a latency of 18 s, which could be
confirmed in the experiment setup. Every sent packet could be
delivered successfully (no bit errors at destination) in the 5-
nodes-network, either in the first transmission or in one of the
three automatic retransmissions. With the equiripple bandpass
filter in place (see Fig. 7), common sources of noise (such as
human speech) were not found to have a considerable effect
on the transmissions. In another test, the absorption of acoustic
TABLE I.
DISTANCES OVERCOME BETWEEN CONNECTED NODES IN THE
INTERCONNECTION EXPERIMENT.
Connected Nodes Distance
N5 ↔ N2 3.4 m
N2 ↔ N3 5.4 m
N3 ↔ N4 2.8 m
N3 ↔ N1 3.3 m
N4 ↔ N1 6.2 m
waves by humans, walking through the experiment setup and,
therefore, blocking the line of sight between two nodes, was
found to have an adverse effect on connectivity. However,
this does not affect the operation of a covert acoustical
mesh network, as transmissions without acknowledgments are
automatically retransmitted. Now that we have shown the
feasibility of implementing covert acoustical mesh networks,
we will have a look at potential applications for these covert
networks.
V. APPLICATIONS OF COVERT ACOUSTICAL MESH
NETWORKS
A. A Multi-Hop Acoustical Keylogger
We use the keylogging software logkeys [15] for our ex-
periment on acoustical multi-hop keylogging. The considered
scenario is depicted in Fig. 12.
Infected Victim AttackerInfected Drones
Keystroke Data Keyst
roke 
Data
Figure 12. Scenario for a multi-hop acoustical keylogger.
The infected victim sends all recorded keystrokes to the
covert acoustical mesh network. Infected drones forward the
keystroke information inside the covert network till the at-
tacker is reached who is now able to read the current keyboard
input of the infected victim from a distant place. To implement
the described scenario, we propose a multi-hop acoustical
keylogger (Fig. 13).
Keylogger TransmitterUser Input Covert 
Network
Figure 13. A multi-hop acoustical keylogger that is maliciously placed at the
infected victim.
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User input is recorded by the keylogger logkeys that must be
in place and started with root privileges at the infected victim.
The keylogger is configured to write any keystrokes to a named
pipe that is read out by the acoustic transmitter. The transmitter
becomes active when a line feed symbol is reached and sends
the keystroke information out to the covert network. The multi-
hop acoustical keylogger has been successfully tested in the
previously defined experimental setup.
B. Connecting to and Tunneling over the Internet
In a more advanced experimental setup, we connect the
attacker to an SMTP server that is connected to the Internet,
collecting frames or lines of keystrokes and sending them out
as email. For this purpose, we propose an SMTP/TCP/IP proxy
(Fig. 14) that encapsulates the data from these frames into the
TCP/IP world.
Covert 
Network
InternetSendmailReceiver
Figure 14. An SMTP/TCP/IP proxy that is used by the attacker to forward
the keystroke information into the Internet.
The acoustical receiver gathers input from the covert net-
work and forwards it to a named pipe. From there, a local
mail server (i.e., sendmail, but a remote mail server could
also be used) is called upon to send an SMTP message out
to an arbitrary email address. This message could just contain
the recorded keystrokes, but it is also possible to include the
GUWMANET/GUWAL headers in order to tunnel the pro-
tocol over HTTP/TCP/IP (circumventing corporate firewalls),
and to extend the covert acoustical mesh network to another
covert network at any place in the world. The attacker has to
be (directly or indirectly) connected to the Internet in order to
perform this procedure, but messages could also be gathered
and sent out as soon as Internet access is established. Sending
out gathered keystrokes to a local SMTP server and forwarding
them to a remote email server has been successfully performed
in the previously defined experimental setup.
C. Other Applications for Covert Networks
Alongside the presented proof-of-concept, even more appli-
cations of covert networks are conceivable. Besides keystroke
information it would also be possible to forward other security
critical data such as private encryption keys or small-sized text
files with classified information from the infected victim to
the covert network. This data could be sent out periodically
to maximize the likelihood of data extraction from the host
and it could also be spread to different environments when
the computing system is carried around.
Finally, an infected drone might not only serve as a router
in the covert network, but it might also offer covert services
to the network. A covert service is a network service that
could, for instance, provide access to further networks (e.g.,
the Internet, if the attacker is not connected to the Internet
itself).
Against malicious participation in a covert acoustical mesh
network, countermeasures might be applied as described in the
following section.
VI. COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST INFORMATION LEAKS
FROM COVERT NETWORKS
A. Implementing Audio Filtering Options
If audio input and output devices cannot be switched off,
implementation of audio filtering options may be an alter-
native approach to counter maliciously triggered participa-
tion in covert networks. In Linux-based operating systems, a
software-defined audio filter can be implemented with ALSA
(Advanced Linux Sound Architecture) in conjunction with the
LADSPA (Linux Audio Developer’s Simple Plugin API) as
mentioned by Phillips [16].
The specific frequencies used by the presented acoustic mo-
dem could be filtered out with a bandpass or lowpass filter. We
tested a 4-pole lowpass filter with LADSPA and a configured
cutoff frequency of 18,000 Hz in the presented experimental
setup that effectively prevented inaudible communications in
any ALSA-based application.
A general approach for audio filtering in a component-
based operating system might be to implement a trusted audio
filtering component, i.e., an audio filtering guard. The audio
filtering guard would be connected to the audio input and
output devices and to the operating system partitions pi and
pj that need access to the audio devices. For all audio input
and output operations, the audio guard would apply input and
output filters. To ensure that audio filtering is always-invoked
in audio input and output, the access control policy of the
component-based operating system needs to enforce that audio
input and output devices can only be accessed via the audio
guard. More details on the concept of an audio filtering guard
are provided by Hanspach and Keller [17].
A more advanced approach might be to implement an audio
intrusion detection system (IDS) that does not only filter
along predefined settings but supports methods for detection of
modulated audio signals and handling input and output based
on the signal characteristics (e.g., as recently presented by
us [2]). This audio IDS might also be implemented as an
operating system guard, as will be described in the following
section.
B. A Host-Based Audio IDS Designed as an Operating System
Guard
The proposed architecture of a host-based audio intrusion
detection guard (Fig. 15) is similar to the described audio
filtering guard, but an IDS state may be included for stateful
inspection of audio input and output.
The audio intrusion detection guard would forward audio
input and output signals to their destination and simultaneously
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Sound 
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Figure 15. Design concept of an audio intrusion detection guard.
store them inside the guard’s internal state where they are
subject to further analyses. Signal analyses might include
frequency, amplitude and phase measurement in order to detect
digital signal processing modes. A decision routine inside the
guard would apply filters to the audio interfaces so that any
audio input from and output to operating system partitions is
filtered. For instance, it is possible to pitch highly suspicious
ultrasonic signals down in order to inform the user of a hidden
audio transmission (we have also demonstrated this with a
mobile detection device, see also [2]). Further information
on the captured signal would be included in the operation
system’s log files in order to enable in-depth assessment of a
possible attack.
The concept of an intrusion detection guard analyzing
device input and output might also be adapted to other types of
physical emanations such as modulated optical transmissions
that have been described by Frankland [18], Loughry and
Umphress [19], and Hasan, Saxena, Tzipora, Shams and
Dustin [20]. Considerations on the systematic identification
of these covert physical channels will be presented in an up-
coming publication [21]. Related studies are further discussed
in the following section.
VII. RELATED WORK
As White et al. [22] pointed out, mobile cyber-physical
system applications might be present on common sensory
devices (e.g., on smartphones). Malware infected devices
might be connected to form a botnet (as described by Dagon,
Gu and Lee [23]). With smartphones and similar devices,
such a botnet might be built upon one of many network
interfaces present in such devices and even on input and
output sensors as we describe in this article, although we
do not specifically experiment with smartphones and focus
at interconnecting laptops. A near-field communication botnet
approach based on bluetooth is presented by Singh, Jain,
Traynor and Lee [24]. We, instead, use audio communications
for our botnet-like approach in near-field communications
to construct a covert acoustical mesh network consisting of
malware infected drones.
Hasan, Saxena, Tzipora, Shams and Dustin [20] present a
botnet approach where different types of physical emanations
are used for command-and-control in botnets. In contrast to
these authors, we are not only looking at command-and-control
messages, but we build a whole covert mesh network from
acoustical emanations.
Different types of physical emanations have been discussed
as means for information leaking. Van Eck [25] describes
the risk from electromagnetic radiations, while Loughry and
Umphress [19] present information leakage from optical ema-
nations. Shamir and Tromer [26], and LeMay and Tan [27]
describe acoustical emanations from the computing system
(e.g., supply capacitors from the computer’s mainboard) that
might leak critical information. We are also using acoustical
emanations for information leakage, but instead of passively
monitoring the computing system in order to exploit a side
channel, we actively produce acoustical emanations to con-
struct a covert channel between different computing systems
and interconnect them into a covert acoustical mesh network.
For eavesdropping on a computer user’s keystrokes by using
a computers’s physical emanations, several techniques have
been proposed. Halevi and Saxena [28] present a study on
acoustical emanations from keyboards where the keyboard
input is recovered from the sound of a keystroke. Raguram,
White, Goswami, Monrose and Frahm [29] discuss a setup
where typed input is recovered from environmental reflec-
tions, while Frankland [18] describes information leakage
over keyboard LEDs that are manipulated to carry an optical
signal. Moreover, Balzarotti, Cova and Vigna [30] show that
keystrokes can be automatically captured by recording the
keyboard with a camera and analyzing the video stream. We
also gather keystrokes from a computer user, but we record
the keystrokes directly on the infected victim (i.e., the user’s
computer) where a malware prototype needs to be placed in
preparation of an attack. This malware prototype contains both
a keylogger software and a network stack for covert acoustic
communication in order to spread the recorded keystrokes over
the covert network.
Using audio as a networking technology has been de-
scribed by Madhavapeddy, Scott, Tse and Sharp [31], by
Yan, Zhou, Shi and Li [32] and by Lopes and Aguiar [33].
Very recently, Nandakumar, Chintalapudi, Padmanabhan and
Venkatesan [34] have presented a study on acoustic peer-
to-peer near-field-communication (up to 15-20 cm), where
eavesdropping by third parties is prevented by the means of
signal jamming. Based on the concept of audio networking, we
construct a wireless mesh network, not with the ambition to
compete with wireless communication standards, but to prove
that covert and stealthy communication is possible with audio
networking and that critical information can be leaked over a
covert acoustical mesh network.
Furthermore, acoustic wave propagation is regularly used
in underwater setups as described by Otnes et al. [35] and
many more authors. We, however, are using a setup for covert
air communications while utilizing parts of an underwater
communication system [9].
Preliminary work on ultrasonic communication has been
performed by Hosman, Yeary, Antonio and Hobbs [36],
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by Tofsted, O’Brien, D’Arcy, Creegan and Elliott [37], by
Altman, Antebi, Atsmon, Cohen and Lev [38], and by Li,
Hutchins and Green [39]. In contrast to these authors, we show
how ultrasonic communication can be placed in the context
of information security and how security critical data can be
leaked over multiple hops of infected drones.
On behalf of the UCAC Consortium, Leus and van Wal-
ree [40] present a setup for stealthy communication with
unmanned underwater vehicles where audio messages are
transmitted “at a low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), thereby hid-
ing messages in the ambient noise and reducing the probability
of detection by third parties”. We also propose a stealthy
audio-based communication system, but we primarily aim
at providing stealthiness in audio transmissions over the air
and from human computer users that might not anticipate
information leaks from audio subsystems. With this scenario
in mind, we build a mesh network upon audio transmissions
that are inaudible to human computer users by utilizing the
ultrasonic frequency range.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the establishment of covert acoustical
mesh networks in air is feasible in setups with commonly
available business laptops. By reutilizing an underwater com-
munication system, we take advantage of a network stack that
was built with robust acoustical communication in mind. The
presented approach to covert acoustical mesh networks allows
to transmit messages with a rate of approximately 20 bit/s up
to a range of 19.7 m between two connected nodes, but much
higher transmission rates would be possible for low-distance
transmissions. The complete path of a single frame from the
infected victim at the first hop to the attacker at the last hop
over two additional infected drones as intermediate hops took
18 s.
Acoustical networking as a covert communication technol-
ogy is a considerable threat to computer security and might
even break the security goals of high-assurance computing
systems that did not consider acoustical networking in their
security concept.
We did not specifically address the problem of how to infect
a computing system with the malware, but this problem exists
with any covert channel technology.
For the prevention of participation in a covert acoustical
network, it might not always be acceptable to switch off the
audio input and output devices, as they might be needed for
IP phone communications and other audio applications. For
these cases it is possible to prevent inaudible communication
of audio input and output devices by application of a software-
defined lowpass filter. An audio filtering guard can be used
to control any audio-based information flow in a component-
based operating system. Furthermore, a host-based audio intru-
sion detection system can be utilized, as we already presented
in a different article. The audio IDS analyzes audio input and
output to detect modulated signals or hidden messages in audio
playback, and it might also be implemented as an operating
system guard.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We would like to thank Jörg Keller, Jochen F. Giese, Hen-
ning Rogge and Tobias Ginzler for their helpful comments. We
also would like to acknowledge Ivor Nissen at the Research
Department for Underwater Acoustics and Marine Geophysics
(FWG) of the Bundeswehr Technical Center WTD 71, Kiel,
Germany, for providing us with access to the source code of an
underwater networking software (based on the open JANUS
waveform protocol) that we adapted for setting up a covert
acoustical mesh network in air.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Hanspach and M. Goetz, “On Covert Acoustical Mesh
Networks in Air,” Journal of Communications, vol. 8, no. 11,
pp. 758–767, Nov. 2013.
[2] ——, “Recent Developments in Covert Acoustical Communi-
cations,” in Sicherheit 2014. Bonn, Germany: GI, Mar. 2014,
pp. 243–254.
[3] B. W. Lampson, “A note on the confinement problem,” Com-
mun. ACM, vol. 16, no. 10, pp. 613–615, Oct. 1973.
[4] M. Hanspach and J. Keller, “A Taxonomy for Attack Patterns
on Information Flows in Component-Based Operating Systems,”
in Proceedings of the 7th Layered Assurance Workshop, New
Orleans, LA, USA, Dec. 2013.
[5] IEEE Standards Association, “IEEE 802.3 Ethernet,” 1985.
[Online]. Available: http://standards.ieee.org/about/get/802/802.
3.html [Accessed: 2013-06-15]
[6] IEEE Standards Association, “IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN,”
1997. [Online]. Available: http://standards.ieee.org/about/get/
802/802.11.html [Accessed: 2013-06-15]
[7] T. Jaeger, J. Liedtke, V. Panteleenko, Y. Park, and N. Islam,
“Security architecture for component-based operating systems,”
in Proc. 8th ACM SIGOPS European workshop on Support for
composing distributed applications, ser. EW 8. New York, NY,
USA: ACM, 1998, pp. 222–228.
[8] J. P. Anderson, “Computer Security Technology Planning
Study,” Tech. Rep. ESD-TR-73-51, Volume II. Electronic Sys-
tems Divison, AFSC, Oct. 1972.
[9] R. Odugoudar and I. Nissen, “Ad-hoc Network Emulation
Framework for Underwater Communication Applications,” in
Proc. 5th ACM International Conference on Underwater Net-
works & Systems. Woods Hole, MA: ACM, Sept. 2010.
[10] I. Nissen and M. Goetz, “Generic UnderWater Application Lan-
guage (GUWAL) - Specification of Tactical Instant Messaging
in Underwater Networks,” Research Department for Underwater
Acoustics and Marine Geophysics, Kiel, Germany, Tech. Rep.
WTD71 - 0070/2012 FR, Dec. 2012.
[11] M. Goetz and I. Nissen, “GUWMANET - Multicast Routing in
Underwater Acoustic Networks,” in Military Communications
and Information Systems Conference, ser. MCC ’12. IEEE,
Oct. 2012, pp. 1–8.
[12] E. Blossom, “GNU radio: tools for exploring the radio fre-
quency spectrum,” Linux J., vol. 2004, no. 122, pp. 4–, June
2004.
[13] G. Z. K McCoy, B Tomasi, “JANUS: the genesis, propagation
and use of an underwater standard,” in European Conference
on Underwater Acoustics, July 2010.
[14] Conexant Systems, Inc., “HD-Audio CODEC with 4DAC,
6ADC, Mono Class D, 2 Capless Headphone Driver, SPDIF
Out/In.” [Online]. Available: http://www.conexant.com/Product/
Audio/pchdaudio/CX2058X [Accessed: 2013-06-15]
[15] Google Code, “logkeys Linux keylogger,” Jan. 2010. [Online].
Available: http://code.google.com/p/logkeys/ [Accessed: 2013-
06-15]
9
[16] D. Phillips, “Linux Audio Plug-Ins: A Look Into LADSPA,”
Feb. 2001. [Online]. Available: http://www.linuxdevcenter.com/
pub/a/linux/2001/02/02/ladspa.html [Accessed: 2013-06-15]
[17] M. Hanspach and J. Keller, “In Guards we trust: Security and
Privacy in Operating Systems revisited,” in Proc. 5th ASE/IEEE
International Conference on Information Privacy, Security, Risk
and Trust, ser. PASSAT ’13. Washington D.C., USA: IEEE,
Sept. 2013.
[18] R. Frankland, “Side Channels, Compromising Emanations and
Surveillance: Current and future technologies,” Department of
Mathematics, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham,
Surrey TW20 0EX, England, Tech. Rep. RHUL-MA-2011-07,
Mar. 2011.
[19] J. Loughry and D. A. Umphress, “Information leakage from
optical emanations,” ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., vol. 5, no. 3,
pp. 262–289, Aug. 2002.
[20] R. Hasan, N. Saxena, T. Haleviz, S. Zawoad, and D. Rinehart,
“Sensing-enabled channels for hard-to-detect command and
control of mobile devices,” in Proc. 8th ACM SIGSAC sympo-
sium on Information, computer and communications security,
ser. ASIA CCS ’13. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2013, pp.
469–480.
[21] M. Hanspach and J. Keller, “The Upcoming Threat of Covert
Communication Technologies,” in Future Security 2014 (to
appear), Berlin, Germany, Sept. 2014.
[22] J. White, S. Clarke, C. Groba, B. Dougherty, C. Thompson, and
D. Schmidt, “R&D challenges and solutions for mobile cyber-
physical applications and supporting Internet services,” Journal
of Internet Services and Applications, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 45–56,
2010.
[23] D. Dagon, G. Gu, and C. Lee, “A Taxonomy of Botnet
Structures,” in Botnet Detection, ser. Advances in Information
Security, W. Lee, C. Wang, and D. Dagon, Eds. Springer US,
2008, vol. 36, pp. 143–164.
[24] K. Singh, S. Sangal, N. Jain, P. Traynor, and W. Lee, “Evaluat-
ing Bluetooth as a Medium for Botnet Command and Control,”
in Proc. 7th International Conference on Detection of Intru-
sions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, DIMVA ’10.
Springer, July 2010, pp. 61–80.
[25] W. van Eck, “Electromagnetic radiation from video display
units: an eavesdropping risk?” Comput. Secur., vol. 4, no. 4,
pp. 269–286, Dec. 1985.
[26] A. Shamir and E. Tromer, “Acoustic cryptanalysis: On
nosy people and noisy machines. The Blavatnik School of
Computer Science, Tel Aviv University.” [Online]. Available:
http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/ [Accessed: 2013-06-15]
[27] M. D. LeMay and J. Tan, “Acoustic Surveillance of Physically
Unmodified PCs,” in Proc. 2006 International Conference on
Security & Management, June 2006.
[28] T. Halevi and N. Saxena, “A closer look at keyboard acoustic
emanations: random passwords, typing styles and decoding
techniques,” in Proc. 7th ACM Symposium on Information,
Computer and Communications Security, ser. ASIACCS ’12.
New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2012, pp. 89–90.
[29] R. Raguram, A. M. White, D. Goswami, F. Monrose, and J.-
M. Frahm, “iSpy: automatic reconstruction of typed input from
compromising reflections,” in Proc. 18th ACM conference on
Computer and communications security, ser. CCS ’11. New
York, NY, USA: ACM, 2011, pp. 527–536.
[30] D. Balzarotti, M. Cova, and G. Vigna, “ClearShot: Eavesdrop-
ping on Keyboard Input from Video,” IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, vol. 0, pp. 170–183, 2008.
[31] A. Madhavapeddy, D. Scott, A. Tse, and R. Sharp, “Audio Net-
working: The Forgotten Wireless Technology,” IEEE Pervasive
Computing, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 55–60, July 2005.
[32] H. Yan, S. Zhou, Z. J. Shi, and B. Li, “A DSP implementation
of OFDM acoustic modem,” in Proc. second workshop on
Underwater networks, ser. WuWNet ’07. New York, NY, USA:
ACM, 2007, pp. 89–92.
[33] C. V. Lopes and P. M. Aguiar, “Acoustic Modems for Ubiqui-
tous Computing,” IEEE Pervasive Computing, vol. 2, no. 3, pp.
62–71, 2003.
[34] R. Nandakumar, K. K. Chintalapudi, V. Padmanabhan, and
R. Venkatesan, “Dhwani: secure peer-to-peer acoustic NFC,”
in Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2013 conference on
SIGCOMM, ser. SIGCOMM ’13. New York, NY, USA: ACM,
Aug. 2013, pp. 63–74.
[35] R. Otnes, A. Asterjadhi, P. Casari, M. Goetz, T. Husøy, I. Nis-
sen, K. Rimstad, P. van Walree, and M. Zorzi, Underwater
Acoustic Networking Techniques, ser. SpringerBriefs in Elec-
trical and Computer Engineering. Springer, 2012.
[36] T. Hosman, M. Yeary, J. K. Antonio, and B. Hobbs, “Multi-
tone FSK for ultrasonic communication,” in Instrumentation
and Measurement Technology Conference (I2MTC), 2010 IEEE,
2010, pp. 1424–1429.
[37] D. Tofsted, S. O’Brien, S. D’Arcy, E. Creegan, and
S. Elliott, “An Examination of the Feasibility of Ultrasonic
Communications Links,” Army Research Laboratory, White
Sands Missile Range, NM, USA, Tech. Rep. ARL-TR-5200,
June 2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/
GetTRDoc?AD=ADA522291 [Accessed: 2013-07-29]
[38] N. Altman, A. Antebi, A. Atsmon, M. Cohen, and Z. Lev,
“Computer communications using acoustic signals,” U.S. Patent
7,480,692 B2, Jan. 2009.
[39] C. Li, D. Hutchins, and R. Green, “Short-range ultrasonic
digital communications in air,” Ultrasonics, Ferroelectrics and
Frequency Control, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 55, no. 4, pp.
908–918, 2008.
[40] G. Leus and P. van Walree, “Multiband OFDM for Covert
Acoustic Communications,” IEEE J.Sel. A. Commun., vol. 26,
no. 9, pp. 1662–1673, Dec. 2008.
10
